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institutions. The economic analysis perceives the need for legal rules, both generally
and in particular, as a corrective for market imperfections, such as monopoly, public
goods, external costs and benefits, and severe informational asymmetries, or the presence of high transaction costs. The General Theory of Second Best, however, holds
that correction for one market imperfection will not necessarily be efficiency-enhancing unless there is also simultaneous correction for all other market imperfections.
Applying that theory to the analysis of legal rules suggests the possibility that, for
instance, a contract rule correcting for an imperfection in the market for consensual
agreements may induce welfare losses elsewhere in the legal system or economy. This
article suggests that scholars working in law and economics should be aware of the
implications of Second-Best Theory and should attempt to explore the possible ill effects that might arise elsewhere from an otherwise efficiency-enhancing rule. However, common law judges who seek to foster efficiency ought to resist the impulse to
incorporate second-best concerns into their rulings. If the legal system is to correct for
second-best problems systematically, it should do so through legislation.
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The "double-dividend hypothesis" suggests that increased taxes on polluting activities can provide two kinds of benefits. The first dividend is an improvement in the
environment, and the second dividend is an improvement in economic efficiency from
the use of environmental tax revenues to reduce other taxes such as income taxes that
distort labor supply and saving decisions. In this paper, Professors Fullerton and Metcalf make four main points. First, the validity of the double-dividend hypothesis cannot logically be settled as a general matter. Second, the focus on revenue in this
literature is misplaced. The article demonstrates that three policies have equivalent
impacts on the environment and on labor supply. One of those policies raises revenue
from the environmental component of the reform, another loses revenue, and a third
has no revenue associated with it. Third, what matters is the creation of privately held
scarcity rents. Policies that raise product prices through some restriction on behavior
may create scarcity rents. Unless those rents are captured by the government, such
policies are less efficient at ameliorating an environmental problem than are policies
that do not create rents. Finally, the article distinguishes between two types of command and control regulations on the basis of whether they create scarcity rents.
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on modem economic theory, it fails to offer a clear replacement for its target. One
can think of the theory more positively as making the general point that the predictions of economic models often require qualification or reversal once all real-world
factors are considered. The great challenge for the theory is to avoid the purist fallacy
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While the computer can outperform world chess masters, it cannot manage natural language as well as a two-year-old child. The manifest precision and Boolean logical structure which permits the computer to perform complex calculations plays an
insignificant role in legal reasoning where ambiguity is often an important characteristic of much of legal language. The future of legal practice will not lie so much in the
direction of computers taking over the functions of lawyers, but rather in a union
between the lawyer and the machine made possible by new and innovative ways of
representing and manipulating legal knowledge in the machine.
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The promises made in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) have been broken, not by uncontrollable
impersonal market forces but by deliberatepolicy choices. These policy choices are at
their roots moral and ethical more than they are legal, economic, or political. Rather
than revisit the debates over proposals to amend these laws, this paper identifies and
discusses the conflicting values and conceptions of rights and justice underlying not
only the promises of the NLRA and the OSHA, but also the choices made in breaking
the promises of those statutes.
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basis of potential pregnancy as discrimination on the basis of sex. Therefore, the PDA
protects a woman's choice to become pregnant while maintaining her position in the
workplace, thereby ensuring Title VII's goal of equal opportunity in employment. This
note argues that the PDA's guarantee of equal opportunity in employment includes
women who attempt to achieve pregnancy through the use of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies.
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In Montana v. Egelhoff, the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute
prohibiting juries from considering evidence of criminal defendants' intoxication.
Thus, the state's burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt was lowered for the mens rea element. The Court held that improving the
state's conviction rate was a valid justification for the prohibition. This comment argues that the Egelhoff precedent violates a defendant's right to a fair trial because the
defendant is not allowed to defend himself with relevant exculpatory evidence.

